The present study represents an original and empirical investigation on the topic of prudential Misconduct, corporate governance and internal control deficiencies, and the dimension of the financial entities are of major concern because this sector is based on trust.
Introduction
Over the past decade, with the financial crisis, the banking and financial industry has experienced high financial penalties and increased scrutiny by regulatory boards. On the one hand, several banking professionals assume that the number and the amount of penalties have lowered bank profitability to an extent that it has created uncertainty concerning the solvency and the business model of these entities (Köster and Pelster, 2017) .
In Italy the banking system was very fragmented from the very beginning in 1936 when there were 2070 banks in the country, many of which were very small. This situation has increased the need for the country to supervise the banking system and since the beginning of the 20th century this supervision has been exercised by the Banca d'Italia. This task was confirmed and extended in 1993 by Legislative Decree 385/1993 (TUB) and subsequently by Legislative Decree 58/1998 (TUF).
With the birth of the European Union, the need for integrating Italian and European vigilance increasingly became important (De Rynck, 2016) To answer these research questions, the study was divided into two parts: in the former a unique dataset was accumulated that consider all the documents and related information on the financial penalties inflicted by Banca d'Italia in the period between 2013 and 2016. For the second part, we elaborated a multivariate regression model with variables linked to specific types of sanctions and items of the 2015 financial reporting standards of all the Italian financial institutions involved and we hand-collected data by downloading the financial reporting standards from the websites of each entity and by analysing in depth the information regarding those sanctions.
Using this unique dataset of financial penalties, this paper is the first that (a) tries to analyse the trend and composition of financial penalties in Italy in the period between 2013 and 2016 and (b) aims at focusing on the real causes, in particular those immediately in the nearest past (2015), which might have had an impact on the amount of sanctions inflicted in 2016.
Misconduct and the resulting financial penalties are of major concern especially in the banking sector because this sector is based on trust (Köster and Pelster, 2017) . Consequently, the risk of reputational damage due to financial penalties is more severe in the banking sector (European Central Bank, 2016) . That is due not only to its financial intermediation and transformation function, but also by systemically relevance of the banking sector for the entire economy.
In addition, financial sanctions may hamper the capacity of these entities to fulfil their intermediation duties and thus limit access to new credit in the economy (European Central Bank, 2016 ).
These elements suggested conducting analyses on this topic and focusing on the financial sector.
This research represents an original contribution in the field because a multivariate analysis of regression was first implied to analyse the main causes related to financial penalties inflicted to financial institutions in Italy.
In addition, this study suggests complementing the literature that deals with corporate misconduct and its implication on firms' policy (Agrawal et al., 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007; Nguyen et al., 2016) . Further, this research contributes to the debate on the effectiveness of regulatory enforcement actions (Schuknecht, 2004) . Delis et al. (2016) considered regulatory intervention in response to capital adequacy and liquidity concerns and its impact on bank risk. Finally, this study might extend the research that examines whether shareholders benefit from corporate misconduct (Bhagat et al., 1998; Bizjak and Coles, 1995; Griffin et al., 2004 ) .
Furthermore, the present work differs from other studies that analysed the impact of financial penalties on the performance of banks (Köster and Pelster, 2017) or the impact of corporate and risk governance on the business management of financial institutions (Aebi et al., 2012) .
Its originality also lies in the choice of the sample analysed with the regression model, which represent the entire population of sanctions inflicted in 2016.
The remainder of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the Literature Review and the Theoretical Background regarding the evolution of banking supervision in Europe and Italy, with particular attention to the role of Banca d'Italia. Section 3 describes the data and sample and the empirical methodology implied for this analysis. Section 4 presents the results, while in Section 5 the discussion of them is presented. Finally, Paragraph 6 deals with conclusions.
Literature Review and Theoretical Background
The importance of the banking system requires careful and prudent vigilance (Barth et al, 2004 (Barth et al, , 2013 trying to avoid bankruptcy (Barth et al, 2006) able with its intervention to maintain the stability and liquidity of the supervised bank (Berger et al., 2016) . In particular, banking supervision should monitor the supervised entity to have an adequate asset structure, but that is not enough. In fact, the supervised subject must also have a close observance of norms and governance able to lead it to deal with market risks (de Haan and Vlahu, 2015; Barakat and Hussainey, 2013) .
The crucial point in the supervisory system was to initiate a process of homogenization of a common (Schuler, 2003) and strong control (Wymeersch, 2014) in all the Member States that came to an end with Regulation no. 1024/2013, which assigned the European Central Bank specific tasks relating to the prudential supervisory policies of credit institutions, namely the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
SSM identifies significant and non-significant institutions, outlining a different modus operandi depending on the supervised subject:
 direct supervision, coordinated by the so-called Joint Supervisory Team (including staff of both competent national authorities and the European Central Bank) implemented on significant entities (120 banking groups representing 85% of total banking activities);  indirect supervision by the competent national authorities, under the BCE close scrutiny, on the least significant entities, very numerous in the economic fabric of certain Euro zone countries.
With this scaffolding, therefore, in Italy, the Bank of Italy has a joint supervisory role for the BCE staff on significant bodies and a direct supervision of the less important bodies.
Many studies dealt with the issues of supervision of individual states and in particular the changes implemented in the European system (Gren et al., 2015) . Some scholars highlighted the need for such integration as these States belong to the Union (Goldstein and Veron, 2011) , while other scholars also questioned the effectiveness of central bank supervision on individual banks (Masciandaro et al., 2013) .
In particular, the Italian market, the one we focused on, is varied and fragmented.
Penalty measures are a important "weapon" (instrument) for Banca d'Italia. These sanction measures, from 1993 until now, have undergone significant changes in the light of numerous national and then Community legislation.
Initially, under Legislative Decree 385/1993, entities subject to pecuniary administrative sanctions were people covering administrative and managerial functions as well as employees within financial and banking intermediaries, i.e. those legal entities, which were reported in the regulatory apparatus of the Single Banking Act (Testo Unico Bancario -TUB).
The administrative sanction was issued following non-compliance with specific standards in the TUB itself.
A second important step in the history of legislation on sanctioning measures was Legislative Decree 58/1998, passed to history as "Single Text of Finance" (Testo Unico della Finanza -TUF), where there is a list of cases that may impose sanctions on those who, by performing administrative or managerial duties or being employees of companies and entities, do not comply with the specific provisions.
The years since 2012 have seen a sharp acceleration in the process of integration of the financial system with the entry into force of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM).
The innovations introduced by the aforementioned Regulation concern sanctioning measures: in fact, for the relevant banks, the BCE has the power to impose pecuniary sanctions against the legal person for violations of European standards for the purposes of carrying out its tasks applicable (European Union regulations, regulations or decisions of the BCE itself). In other cases (breach of national rules, including in the transposition of European directives, violations by natural persons, non-pecuniary sanctions), the sanction is determined by the National Supervisory Authority at the request of the BCE.
On the contrary, as regards smaller banks defined as less significant, the BCE has the power to impose pecuniary penalties only for breaches of regulations and decisions directly issued by the BCE. In all other cases the sanctioning power belongs to Banca d'Italia, without any reference to the BCE's opinion.
As mentioned, the most profound change has been in the case of larger institutions: a sanction of any regulatory source (European or national) cannot be fulfilled without the BCE's approval.
Empirical Design

Data and Research Questions
For the empirical analysis on the sanctions inflicted by Banca d'Italia in the period between 2013 and 2016, we hand-collected information regarding the typology and the amount of sanctions by reading and analysing all the reports and official documents published in the website of the Italian Central Bank.
The majority of the financial institutions examined here do not provide specific information on misconduct-related expenses in their annual reports. These expenses are typically aggregated with other expenses. Moreover, not all the institutions considered are listed on the stock exchange, therefore some data could not be considered in order to provide a homogeneous analysis for all the items of the sample.
In addition, to elaborate the multivariate regression analysis we downloaded the 2015 financial reporting standards by the websites of the financial institutions sanctioned. Comprehensively we analysed eighty-one types of sanctions related to thirty-two financial institutions.
Our analysis is based on the following hypotheses: 
Methodology
The empirical analysis is divided into two parts: the former is related to the analysis of the trend of sanctions in the period between 2013 and 2016, the latter consists in a quantitative analysis of a multivariate regression model (ANOVA).
In the first part, the analysis is mainly conducted by emphasising the role of Banca d'Italia and by analysing qualitatively the several typologies of sanctions. After this analysis, we concentrated on the multivariate regression (ANOVA).
Regression analysis was chosen as it is usually used to predict the value of one or more responses from a set of predictors and to estimate the linear association between the predictors and responses. 
Results
As regards the first part of the analysis the research focuses on the analysis of the trend of sanctions in the period between 2013-2016 as it represents the most important period of the entire sanctioning history and has brought into force a fundamental reform of the SSM in 2014. Considering the set of sanctions imposed, a noteworthy variable is the typology of the sanctioned body. As we have previously analyzed, it is not the body that is sanctioned, but the physical person who, alternatively:
 has the powers of direction, administration and control,
 is an employee of the company with responsibility for specific functions,  acts on the basis of relationships that determine its insertion into the organizational structure, it should not apply one or more of those rules in the same provision.
Comprehensively Although the recipients of the measures are almost always natural persons, it should not be forgotten that these sanctions are the result of their work within the supervised entities. It goes without saying that the entity in question has almost always a certain responsibility for not having avoided or for having late identified a misconduct by any subject that has a more or less apical position within the organisational chart.
It is therefore consistent to carry out an analysis on some of the variables of the institution in which the person in question carries out his duties, in the light of the intrinsic responsibility of the same body. In other words, without prejudice to the responsibility of the sanctioned natural person, we cannot assure that the legal person is without any responsibility: in the presence of a proper control system, it can and must be minimized the possibility of a non-compliance behaviour by each individual subject.
As a result, by analyzing the legal entities affected by sanctions, 211 institutes are involved in the four-year period, some of which are subject to two or more sanctions over the period considered.
In the graph below the percentage distribution can help analyze the subject.
Graph 2:
Percentage distribution analysis by type of sanctioned entity.
Source: graph elaborated by the authors.
As can be seen from Graph 2, the most recurring type of institution is the banking institution in the form of a cooperative company, which is the recipient of a sanction measure in 42% of cases (89 institutions sanctioned).
A credit cooperative bank is a member-owned financial cooperative, democratically controlled by its members, and it operates for the purpose of promoting thrift, providing credit at competitive rates and providing other financial services to its members. More than fifty percent of total Italian banks are credit cooperative banks (BCCs). They usually are small banks (according to the classification of Banca d'Italia) and their total weight on the loan market is 8%. In addition, they are particularly relevant for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). In the Italian context, credit cooperative banks base their organisation and mission on mutualism and localism (Zago and Dongili, 2014 TUB and the special one ex 107 TUB in a single bulletin) are the most present in the sanction (42 entities). We find, therefore, the classic banks organized in the form of joint-stock companies, which also include the former savings banks, which are sanctioned in 12% of cases (25 entities).
The same percentage drops to 8% for former popular banks (17 institutions), as well as for savings management companies (SGRs) and 5% for mobile brokerage firms (11 SIMs).
Two Payment Institutions (IMEL -Istituto di Moneta Elettronica e di Pagamento), which are companies, other than banks and electronic money institutions, authorized to provide payment services were sanctioned.
Overall, banking institutions are targeted by the sanction in 131 of 211 (about two times out of three).
Once we understand whether and how the sanction system has changed after the introduction of the SSM and analyzed who, in terms of both legal entity and natural person, is the subject of the sanction with greater frequency, it is fundamental to pay attention to the object of irregularities found during the inspection by Banca d'Italia that caused the imposition of the sanction.
The data are shown in Graph 3. Comprehensively, in the four-year period considered, Banca d'Italia issued 245 sanctioning measures for 211 different institutions for a total of 584 irregularities found.
The most common type of irregularity detected, 172 cases on the 584 analyzed, is the lack of governance, internal control system and organization found in the body.
In the present case, it can only be the administrative body to be considered to be the principal responsible, since it is precisely the task of "governing" the undertaking in question.
It is certainly not a case that we are in a situation where the board of directors is called upon to respond substantially to poor management nearly as many times as it is recognized a responsibility also to the controlling body.
A further type of irregularity found (found 145 out of 584) is represented by the lack of controls carried out by that body, typically the board of auditors, specially used for internal control of the This aspect has a clear explanation: first, the credit process, being the credit of the banking core business, is inexorably intertwined with corporate governance and its way of giving rules, processes, systems to manage all the risks the company faces. Second, credit risk is a variable directly attributable to management in the strict sense: if the process is not performing properly, responsibility can only be of the body who decides how to "run a bank," so the administrative body.
In 12% of cases (68 out Finally, the last category of sanctions analyzed when the body does not have the minimum capital.
In this type we find 22 cases on 584 (about 4%). The minimum capital requirement is very important as it concerns the prudential vigilance of the watchdog.
Finally, in the Other category, a variety of different and disparate disadvantages of behaviour that cannot be recommended in the previous categories have been identified.
As regards the second part of the analysis, we considered the impact of determinant causes on the amount of sanctions inflicted by Banca d'Italia in 2016 to all the financial institutions involved.
We first analysed the Pearson correlation ratio (Table 3 ) among the variables well described in previous paragraph and involved in the multivariate regression analysis. The other correlations are less relevant in our study, but we briefly summarize them. The number of sanctions is positively correlated with the dummy audit committee, which in turn is positively correlated with the dummy internal control. The dummy default is negatively correlated with the dummy M&A.
This table allows to introduce the results linked to the ANOVA regression model, described in the previous paragraph.
The model is based on the following null and alternative hypothesis:
The following table summarizes the results derived from the application of the model. Table 4 shows that the multivariate model explains in both sectors more than 70% of the entire population. As the sample represents the entire population of financial institutions that were sanctioned by Banca d'Italia in 2016, the F value is low but the significance of the model is high.
Problems of collinearity emerge with the DummyIntCont and DummyAuditComm. In fact VIF is quite higher than 2, Tolerance index is lower than 0,50 but the Condition Index is lower than 3.
Cook's distance and leverage confirm that the model well represents the entire population.
All independent variables are considered significant, in particular the extremely significant (1% significance) variables are the one that considers the number of sanctions inflicted in 2016, the dummy variable linked to violations of the anti-money laundering regulations, internal control deficiencies, audit committee deficiencies, default and the dummy variable linked to M&A.
Therefore the null hypothesis can be rejected for those variables.
Consequently, to answer RQ2 it can be affirmed that the dimension is a significant element that deeply influences the amount of the financial penalties, and as regards corporate governance, sanctions related to deficiencies in the internal control system and audit committee affected in a significant way the sanctions, such as the default condition of the financial institution or the M&A operation. In addition, the same can be noted for ROE (performance of the financial institution).
As a consequence, the second hypothesis can be confirmed.
Despite the fact that this model represents the first attempt to analyse the causes and possible relationships between several diverse elements and the sanctions inflicted by Banca d'Italia, it needs to be implemented with other variables that correctly reflect the impact of deficiencies and bad actions of the management and corporate governance boards of those institutions in the period before 2015.
Discussion
As regards the first step of the empirical analysis and to answer RQ1, the significant reduction in sanctions in the period under consideration after the introduction of SSM, first of all, might be due to changes at cultural level, giving rise to the first concrete results of 'Regulators' activities. In addition, most of the sanction measures contain causal deficiencies in controls and risk management, especially credit and operating risk. It is clear that without an adequate control system and a coherent organizational structure, involving both corporate governance and risk management, the profitability of each financial institution might suffer, regardless of the presence of these sanctions. Therefore hp2 can be confirmed.
In addition, sanctions can affect the reputation of those entities, as the reputational risk more than anything else affects the financial world, a world where customer confidence in the system is fundamental (Ingo, 2016; Fiordelisi et al., 2013) . A sanction by the supervisory authority is certainly not good news for a company that is operating in a sector such as the financial one, so sensitive to the reputational issue, or may have profound operational implications, especially in the short term, for example, in obtaining the liquidity needed for the banking management operation.
Such a massive presence of credit cooperative banks as recipients of sanctions is certainly a weakness in this particular way of "doing bank activities": a way, as we know, relegated to small realities, particularly linked to the territory, and sometimes that makes it hard to adapt to the everchanging banking world.
Apart from some exceptional cases, sanctioning measures in recent years did not concern large institutes that have a capillary presence almost all over the national territory.
From the analysis of correlation, there emerged that the dependent variable (Sanctions) is positively correlated with the number of sanctions and the dimension of the financial intermediary.
Therefore the bigger the financial institution the higher the financial penalty was in 2016.
Consequently entities with more numerous sanctions were also those that had the higher financial penalty in 2016.
This result does not confirm the first hypothesis of the analysis. And this represent a significant element for our discussion.
The econometric model of multivariate regression also confirms that the variables implied are all significant. In particular, the diverse typologies of sanctions have a huge and negative impact on the amount of sanctions inflicted on the financial institution.
In addition, if the financial entity was experiencing a process of winding-up or a M&A operation in 2016, that condition was also significant for the determination of the financial penalty.
The dimension of the financial intermediary was extremely important even in this second step of analysis because the analysis confirms what emerged in the correlation analysis.
As regards the influence of the corporate governance boards, this analysis is propaedeutic to a much more deepened research as in this context we just considered the impact of two different clusters of sanctions on the comprehensive amount of penalty.
This model however allowed to consider as important also the performance of the financial institution in 2015 and the number of sanctions inflicted by Banca d'Italia.
Conclusion
From a careful analysis of the various sanctions, there emerge that the subject sanctioned are members of the internal audit firm (board of statutory auditors) and administration (board of directors): this peculiarity is the object of this provision with respect to all the other relationships analyzed.
The importance of good governance and a good system of controls is the basis for "running" a bank and is one of the most important points in the controls and the corresponding sanctions. About twothirds of sanctions inflicted by Banca d'Italia concern these issues, as proof of the centrality of the subject. Indeed, the majority of penalties are organizational shortcomings, related to the internal controls system, credit controls and credit deficiencies, which are crucial for banks, especially local ones. It is no coincidence that on these matters the entire banking world has not only concentrated its resources over the last few years, but testing the internal control system is becoming more and more a strategic competitive advantage in the financial business. Another common characteristic among the entities receiving these measures is that many cases have been examined, and then the undertakings have either been subjected to crisis or embedded procedures which, individually considered, do not necessarily result in a situation of instability, but often such extraordinary operations are the means to heal situations that an enterprise cannot overcome. This analysis also provides an important starting point because it points out that irregularities found by the supervisory authority inherent to the minimum capital requirement are often the prelude to worse situations.
Prudential supervision, therefore, is an effective means of control to guarantee the stability of the system: this consideration is by no means a disadvantage in a complex economic context such as the present one.
Over the last two years, all significant banks within the European Union have strengthened from the balance sheet but the average value of their listed shares fell by 20% (Crosio, 2017) . This is due to the fact that the costs in terms of increased vigilance did not have a positive impact on the assessment of major institutions and therefore of the banking system as a whole. For a full analysis, however, we must not dwell on short-term results, but it is necessary to assess the impacts of the supervisory system in the long run, which is why we cannot yet reach a judgment on the new system Supervision implemented by the BCE.
By closing this in-depth analysis, we cannot say with certainty that the sanctioning power recognized by the Bank of Italy has the capacity to counteract any form of banking crisis or to direct the whole financial system to the road of efficiency and compliance at all levels.
However we can conclude by saying that first of all, the reduction in the number of measures between 2013-2014 and 2015-2016 , not accompanied by a reduction in supervisory activity, is a signal that the work of Banca d'Italia is giving its results. The banking system has become increasingly careful in terms of compliance with the complex regulatory framework in the reference sector, benefiting all the stability of the system.
Secondly, but not less important, the sanctioning measure is a necessary but not sufficient weapon in the arsenal of any vigilance body. Certainly this tool can only be used by Banca d'Italia in its supervisory action. The vigilance has changed dramatically following the European harmonization process, which has reached its peak with the introduction of the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
Right after this turn, many feared a complete loss of powers by Banca d'Italia: on the less significant level, however, it retained sanction powers on most issues. Furthermore, by considering that the majority of entities subjected to financial penalties were little and less structured institutions, the higher sanctions were inflicted to those realities considered bigger according to the level of assets.
These considerations help introduce all the limits of this research and the possible developments of analysis. First of all, it is necessary to underline that this research represents the first step of a far deeper analysis and, as we mentioned above, this econometric model is the first attempt to try to catch up the possible causes that influenced the penalty system of Banca d'Italia in 2016. It is obvious that there would be other items and situations that might have affected the determination of the sanction in 2016. This is the reason why this analysis presents several opportunities to be furthered and improved with other variables. It would be useful to analyse the profiles and the background of the members of the governance boards, or the financial reporting standards of the previous three years in order to consider their eventual relevance and influence on financial penalties.
It would be interesting to compare and contrast the Italian situation with that of other European countries, such as France or Germany. To do that, it might be also helpful an empirical qualitative investigation, through a multiple-case study.
